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Taiwan Re-recognized: A Model for Taiwan's 
Future Global Status 
More than a decade has passed since the United States 
officially recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) as 
the legitimate government of China. In 1979, American policy 
makers concluded that recognizing the PRC was in the United 
States' best interest. At that time, the United States saw im- 
proving relations with China as an effective means of counter- 
ing Soviet expansionism. The United States also predicted that 
improved relations with Beijing would win access to China's 
untapped market of over one billion consumers. 
In recognizing the PRC, however, the United States 
derecognized its long time faithfiil ally-the Republic of China 
on .Taiwan (ROC)-which also claims to be China's legitimate 
government. While derecognition did not materially alter U.S.- 
Taiwan relations, it did spur Taiwan's loss of status within the 
global community. Taiwan lost representation in most of the 
world's principal international structures, including the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, and General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Furthermore, with the exception 
of several Third World countries dependent upon Taiwan's eco- 
nomic assistance, most countries followed the united States in 
breaking off official ties with Taiwan.' 
Today, Asia is different than it was when the United 
States normalized relations with the PRC. The Soviet Union is 
no longer perceived as the region's expansionist nemesis. More- 
over, U.S. trade with China has not lived up to expectations, 
1. J. COPPER, TATWAN: NATION-STATE OR PROVINCE? 112-13 (1990). Prior to 
1979, Taiwan had already lost its seat at the United Nations and an increasing 
number of countries were shifting ties to Beijing. After the United States recog- 
nized Beijing in 1979, that once small stream of abandoning countries and interna- 
tional organizations became a flood. See id. See also Kau, Taiwan and Beuing's 
Campaigns for Unifxation, in TAIWAN IN A TIME OF TRANSITION 175, 187-90 (H. 
Feldman, M. Kau & I. Kim e b .  1988) (listing countries which maintain diplomatic 
relations with the ROC and the PRC). 
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and hopes for the timely democratization of China were virtual- 
ly crushed by the tanks at Tienanmen. By contrast, Taiwan, 
despite its small size2 and population: has become the United 
States' fifth largest trading partner4 and has achieved a per 
capita income twenty times that of mainland China.5 In addi- 
tion, Taiwan has rapidly democratized its political ~ y s t e m . ~  
Some things have not changed. The United States contin- 
ues to  seek the peaceful and prosperous democratic develop- 
ment of the Pacific region. In light of the region's new order, 
however, the United States should reappraise its policy for 
meeting this goal. What role should Taiwan play in building a 
peaceful and prosperous democratic Pacific region? Should 
Taiwan be isolated, as Beijing advocates, or does Taiwan's mod- 
el of economic and political development merit an enhanced 
status in the international community? If Taiwan is to play a 
more prominent role, should the United States officially recog- 
nize the ROC? Could Taiwan be recognized without seriously 
aggravating U.S.-PRC relations? Does Taiwan even desire offi- 
cial recognition? 
Part I1 of this article sets the stage for the discussion of 
these issues by summarily recounting the United States' nor- 
malization of relations with the PRC and its effect on Taiwan. 
Part I11 examines the concept of recognition and whether offi- 
2. Taiwan is a 90 by 120 mile island (approximately 13,968 square miles), 
making it roughly the size of Massachusetts and Connecticut combined. H. KWANG, 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 3 (1987). Taiwan is 
situated just off the southeastern coast of mainland China. The island is 225 miles 
north of the Philippines, 665 miles southwest of Japan, and 90 miles east of the 
PRC. Therefore, while the island is small, its central location in the Pacific Rim 
has helped it to become an economic hub of the region. See id. See also J. COPPER, 
supra note 1, at 1-2. 
3. While Taiwan's population of approximately 20 million people is small com- 
pared to the populations of many countries, Taiwan is five times more densely 
populated than the PRC, making it one of the most densely populated countries in 
the world. See J. COPPER, supra note 1, at 6. Adding to Taiwan's congested living 
conditions, most of its people live in coastal urban regions which constitute just one- 
fourth of the island's total area. See id. 
4. Droker & Sander, Market Taiwan, BUSINESS AMERICA, June 19, 1989, vol. 
110, no. 12, at 2 (In 1988, U.S. exports to Taiwan reached $9.6 billion (excluding 
gold), and imports reached $26 billion.). Taiwan is also the world's twelfth largest 
trader, with two-way trade of $108 billion in 1988. Id. See generally, infra note 64 
(economic assessment of Taiwan). 
5. J. COPPER, supra note 1, at 92. See generally, infra note 65 (economic as- 
sessment of Taiwan). 
6. See infia note 66 (political appraisal of Taiwan). 
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cia1 recognition of the ROC would be consistent with interna- 
tional legal norms. Part IV discusses the options for Taiwan's 
future and the desirability of re-recognition given the current 
interests of the ROC, PRC, and United States. Part IV also 
proposes a modified version of Beijing's "one country, two gov- 
ernments" model for recognizing both the ROC and the PRC 
while theoretically permitting both governments to remain in 
control of China. This model would conceivably increase 
Taiwan's international stature and, at the same time, provide a 
framework within which either a policy of reunification or inde- 
pendence could be fostered. This article concludes that the ROC 
deserves official recognition, that recognition of the ROC is 
legally and politically viable, and that recognition is consistent 
with the United States' interest in the peaceful and prosperous 
democratic development of the Pacific region. 
11. NORMALIZATION OF U.S.-PRC RELATIONS AND ITS EFFECT 
ON U.S.-ROC RELATIONS 
A. Normalizing Relations with the PRC; 
Derecognizing the ROC 
When Chiang Kai-Shek and two million ROC Nationalists were 
forced to flee China in 1949, the allegiance of their wartime 
ally-the United States-crossed the Taiwan Strait with them. 
Strong U.S.-ROC ties, solidified by the Cold War, continued for 
thirty years.' However, U.S.-ROC relations began to change in 
the Sixties. The United States began t o  perceive the potential 
strategic and economic benefits of warming relations with the 
PRC. While Washington was convinced of the benefits of better 
relations with the PRC, it took three U.S. presidents and twen- 
ty years to  ultimately normalize relations with the PRC? Nor- 
7. The Truman administration was a little skeptical about supporting Taiwan 
immediately following World War I1 because it believed that Chiang Kai-Shek was 
a corrupt leader who was incapable of success. Its position abruptly changed, 
however, when communist North Korea invaded South Korea, and the United 
States ended up stationing its Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. Myers, A 
Unique Relationship, in A UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP: THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA UNDER THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT 1, 1-2 @amon H. Myers 
ed., 1989). In addition to military aid, the United States gave Taiwan approxi- 
mately $1.5 billion in economic aid from 1952 to 1968. Id at 2. 
8. See generally Feldman, Development of U.S.-Taiwan Relations 1948-1987, in 
TAIWAN IN A TIME OF TRANS~ION, supm note 1, at 137-51 (history of U.S. normal- 
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malization9 was initiated by Richard Nixon, fostered by Gerald 
Ford, and consummated by Jimmy Carter on January 1, 1979 
when the United States established official diplomatic relations 
with the PRC.1° 
As a condition to recognizing the PRC, the United States 
broke off official diplomatic relations and abrogated its security 
pact with the ROC." Derecognition seemed unavoidable since 
both the PRC and the ROC insisted that they were the legiti- 
mate government of China. After derecognition, the ROC was 
no longer China to the United States, but simply Taiwan and 
its people. Taiwan was not completely surprised by the United 
States' action. In fact, it had been slowly adapting to the U.S.- 
PRC detente of the Seventies. Nevertheless, Carter's hasty 
decision to break with Taiwan left many in Taiwan bitter.12 
At the time the United States broke diplomatic ties with 
Taiwan, its Taiwan policy was intentionally ambiguous. Wash- 
ington surmised that Beijing was so eager to build U.S.-PRC 
ties that Washington could deliberately gloss over the issue of 
whether Taiwan was part of the PRC." Washington, likewise, 
had no intention of letting the Taiwan issue hamper improved 
relations with Beijing." The Shanghai Communique, signed 
by President Nixon in 1972 acknowledged that the United 
States did not challenge the position of "all Chinese on either 
side of the Taiwan Strait [that] there is but one China and that 
Taiwan is a part of China."ls Nixon did not explicitly state, 
izing relations with PRC); Hinton, The Republic of China on Taiwan Since 1949, in 
AMERICA AND ISLAND CHINA 9, 12-13 (S. Gilbert & W. Carpenter eds., 1989) @rief 
overview of normalization). 
9. One noted diplomat defined "normalization", in this context, as "a term 
somewhere between euphemism and codeword that all understood to mean the estab- 
lishment of full diplomatic relations with the PRC." Feldman, supra note 8, at  143. 
10. See Id. at 150. 
11. See J. COPPER, supra note 1, at 98. 
12. The Carter administration gave ROC President Chiang Ching-Kuo six hours 
notice before it announced that it would establish diplomatic relations between 
Washington and Beijing, to take effect in two weeks. Feldman, supra note 8, at 
150-51. See a h  THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT: A DECADE OF ~MPLEMENTATION 6-7 
(W. Bader & J. Bergner eds. 1989) [hereinafter DECADE OF IMPLEMENTATION] 
(Carter administration's treatment of normalization incensed Congress). 
13. Copper, Democracy on Taiwan Could CMenge United States-China Policy, 
H ~ R ~ A G E  FOUND. REP., July 14, 1987, at 2. 
14. Id. 
15. President Nixon's Visit to the Peoples Republic of China, 66 U.S. DEFT ST. 
Bu. 435, 437-38 (Mar. 20, 1972). See also DECADE OF IMPLEMENTATION, supra 
note 12, at 4 (Amrding to Kissinger, the purpose of this language was "to put off 
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however, that Taiwan was part of China. Furthermore, the 
1979 Joint Communique establishing diplomatic relations be- 
tween the United States and the PRC recognized "the Govern- 
ment of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Gov- 
ernment of China," but i t  did not confirm the PRC's legal claim 
to Taiwan? 
B. The Taiwan Relations Act and the Practical Effect of 
Normalized U.S. -PRC Relations on U. S. -ROC Relations 
On April 10, 1979, Washington moved to dispel the confu- 
sion surrounding U.S.-Taiwan relations and soften the shock 
that had resulted from the rupture of diplomatic ties with Tai- 
wan by enacting the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).17 Congress 
enacted the TRA to maintain "close and friendly commercial, 
cultural, and other relations between the people of the United 
States and the people on Taiwan."18 
The TRA does not refer to Taiwan as the "Republic of China," 
but as the people of Taiwan, their institutions, and "the govern- 
ing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as 
the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979."" Relations 
between the United States and Taiwan after 1979 were re- 
stricted to "unofficial" relations by the Joint Communique and 
the TRAFO In spite of this label, however, the TRA and sup- 
plemental agreements have, to some extent, reestablished the 
United States' recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign nation- 
state. For example, except for the use of diplomatic license 
plates and diplomatic passports, the United States extends 
essentially the same diplomatic privileges to representatives 
from Taiwan as it extends to diplomats from officially recog- 
the issue of Taiwan for the future, to  enable the two nations to close the gulf of 
twenty years and to pursue parallel policies where their interests coincided."). 
16. Joint Communique on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the 
United States of America and the People's Republic of China, 79 U.S. DEPV ST. 
BUU. No. 2022, at 25 (1979). See also Copper, supm note 13, at  2. 
17. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3316 (1988). Raymon Myers claims that the relationship 
established by the TRA was unique because "[plerhaps for the first time in the 
history of modern foreign affairs, a state had broken relations with another, only 
to create a new legal arrangement so as to maintain virtually all the relationships 
that had existed before." Myers, supra note 7, at  13. 
18. 22 U.S.C. 8 3301(bX1) (1988). 
19. Id. # 3301(a)(l). 
20. The TRA, however, describes U.S.-Taiwan relations without using the word 
"unofficial". See 22 U.S.C. '$8 3301-3316. 
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nized nations.21 The TRA also grants Taiwan access to U.S. 
The TRA also counteracts the United States' termination of 
its security pact with the ROC by promising military aid. The 
TRA declares that "the United States will make available to 
Taiwan such defense articles and defense services . . . as may 
be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- 
defense ~apabili ty. '~~ Although the United States has sold 
over five billion dollars worth of arms to Taiwan since 1979," 
sales have been sharply curtailed in recent yeamas The TRA 
also provides that any nonpeaceful actions against Taiwan, 
including boycotts or embargoes, will be considered "a threat to 
the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave 
concern to the United States."26 
The TRA is evidence that the United States has assumed 
significant responsibility for maintaining Taiwan's security and 
a peaceful environment for fostering Taiwan's economic and 
political development? The TRA has successfully cultivated a 
relationship of expanded U.S.-ROC trade. Since the TRA's en- 
actment, two-way trade between the United States and the 
ROC had increased from nine billion dollars to over thirty-five 
billion dollars, making Taiwan the United States' fifth largest 
trading partner." 
While the TRA has helped foster a peaceful environment 
for Taiwan's economic and political development, the T W s  
21. Recent Developments-Intemtwnal Agreements: United States-Taiwan Rela- 
tions, 22 HARV. INT1, L J .  451, 456 (1981). 
22. 22 U.S.C. 33030sX7) (1988). 
23. Id. 8 3302(a). 
24. Copper, supra note 13, at 2. 
25. Myers, supm note 7, at 16-18. The Reagan admirrintration refused to sell 
Taiwan advanced weapon systems and promised the PRC that the United States 
would reduce the quantity of weapons sold to Taiwan. Some claim the agreement 
with the PRC' to limit the quantity and quality of weapons sold to Taiwan 
breached the TRA provision which states that Congress and the President should 
make these decisions based on Taiwan's needs and not on the PRC's wishes. 
Feldman, supra note 8, at  153. Nevertheless, Taiwan has taken up the slack by 
committing more resources to developing advanced weapons necessary to deter 
possible PRC aggression, and the United States has been willing to assist Taiwan 
in this development by providing technology, design, and construction services. 
Myers, supra note 7, at  18. 
26. 22 U.S.C. 3301(bX4) (1988). 
27. See Copper, supra note 13, at  2. For more on Taiwan's economic and po- 
litical development, see infnt notes 65-66. 
28. See Droker & Sander, supra note 4, at 2. 
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unofficial recognition of the ROC has not improved Taiwan's 
international status. Taiwan is still denied membership in all 
but one major international organization." Official recognition 
by the United States could rectify this. The ramifications of 
recognizing the ROC will be considered below. 
111. 'ERECOGNITION" IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 
"Recognition" is a political expression by the government of 
the recognizing country attesting that an entity meets the qual- 
ifications of statehood or that a regime meets the qualifications 
of a government.30 Recognition of a country by participating 
members of the world community is vital to a country's status 
and activity within the world community. Under customary 
international law, the qualifications for recognition as a nation- 
state include (1) a defined territory, (2) a government which 
has effective control over the territory:' (3) a permanent pop- 
ulation, and (4) a capacity to enter into relations with other 
nation-states.32 
Possession of these qualXications, however, does not guar- 
antee that a country will be recognized as a nation-state. Histo- 
ry demonstrates that political considerations predominate the 
granting of recognition. Countries ultimately recognize other 
countries in order to advance their own national interests, not 
merely to express their allegiance to international legal princi- 
p l e ~ . ~ ~  
The world community's failure to recognize the ROC illus- 
trates the sigmficant role political considerations can play in 
determining whether to recognize de jure nation-states. The 
29. See Kau, supra note 1, at 189 (the only important international organiza- 
tion that Taiwan belongs to is the Asian Development Bank). 
30. See J .  SWEENEY, C .  OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL EGAL SYS- 
TEM 894 (3d ed. 1988); B. WESTON, R. FALK & A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND WORLD ORDER 280 (1980) (quoting Schwebel, "Cognition" and the Peking 
V i s i t I s  the Recognition of G6vernnzents Obsolete?, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 23, 
1972, $ A, at 16, col. 3). 
31. B. W E ~ N ,  supm note 30, at 280. 
32. See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, 
December 26, 1933, 165 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIES 19 (1933). 
33. B. WESTON, supra note 30, at 266-67 (quoting J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 14961 (8th ed. 1977) ("[tlhere is an irresistible tendency in 
recognizing States to use legal principles as a convenient camouflage for political 
decisions")). One scholar suggests that %cognition decisions . . . be based solely on 
whether the new government has control of its state." Peterson, Recognition of 
Governments Should Not Be Abolished, 77 AM. J. I W L  L. 31, 50 (1983). 
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ROC has never ceased to meet the legal criteria for recognition. 
In fact, the ROC is in control of a territory and population that 
is larger than the average contemporary na t ion-~ta te .~  The 
ROC government is more stable than the governments of most 
nation-states. And while its diplomatic ties are few, its capacity 
to enter into relations with other nation-states compares favor- 
ably with many Third World countries.35 Nevertheless, as 
mentioned before, most countries-including the United States- 
--do not recognize the ROC. In 1979, U.S. policy makers re- 
nounced any official recognition of the ROC after determining 
that U.S. interests would be better served by stronger ties with 
Beijing. Washington felt that strong ties with Beijing could be 
used as its "China card" to be played against the Soviet 
threat.36 Washington also thought that strong ties with Bei- 
jing would best serve its overall economic interests in Asia 
since mainland China offered a large, mostly untapped, mar- 
ketplace for U.S. business. Finally, while recognition of the 
PRC necessitated derecognition of the ROC, many in Washing- 
ton believed that this could be accomplished without sacrificing 
U.S. economic or political ties with 
The circumstances which led to the United States' decision 
to deny the ROC official recognition in 1979 have changed 
dramatically in the last twelve years. Today there are much 
fewer compelling political considerations for the United States 
not to recognize the ROC. The United States is no longer play- 
ing its China card to check Soviet expansionism because the 
34. J. COPPER, supra note 1, at 123. 
35. Id 
36. Ironically, it was for basically the same underlying political reasons that 
the United States had recognized the ROC while refusing to recognize the PRC for 
the thirty years prior to 1979 when the PRC also satisfied the legal criteria for 
recognition. During the Fifties, the United States' policy for containing the spread 
of communism was to "isolate and contain the PRC's foreign policy through trade 
embargo and building alliances in the Pacific Basin. The U.S. State Department 
announced in May 1951 that the United States had no intention of recognizing the 
PRC and instead would recognize the ROC as having sovereignty over the main- 
land." Myers, supra note 7, at 11. This policy began to change in the Sixties, 
however, when Beijing broke off relations with Moscow and many advocated giving 
the PRC a seat at the United Nations. h m  that point on, the United States 
increased its contacts with the PRC. Id at 12. 
37. While Washington realized the potential economic benefits of ;loser ties 
with the PRC, it did not want to give up existing economic benefits with Taiwan. 
In 1979 the United States and the ROC'S two-way trade reached $9 billion, U.S. 
investments in Taiwan exceeded $6.6 billion, and the two had entered into more 
than 60 treaties and agreements. Id at 14. 
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Soviet Union has abandoned its expansionist course. Further- 
more, U.S. business in the PRC has failed to turn a profit and 
has dropped sharply since the events of Tienanmen. 
IV. TAIWAN'S FUTURE GLOBAL STATUS 
A. ROC-PRC Relations and the Future of Taiwan 
Since the basis for Taiwan's derecognized status is its 
claim as the legitimate government of China, Taiwan's future 
is inextricably tied to its relationship with the PRC. The possi- 
ble legal and political relationships that could develop between 
the ROC and the PRC are numerous. However, the most likely 
relationships to develop are (1) forced reunification under com- 
munist rule, (2) Taiwan independence or maintenance of the 
status quo, (3) reunification under the "one country, two sys- 
tems" formula, or (4) peaceful reunification under democratic 
rule. The likelihood and implications of each of these four sce- 
narios is discussed below. 
1. Forced reunification under communist rule 
Forced reunification by the PRC represents the worst, but 
plausible, case scenario for Taiwan and the region. Taiwan has 
so much to  lose by reunification that it may never voluntarily 
agree to reunify, and Beijing, for its part, has maintained that 
it "could not pledge never to use force to achieve reunifica- 
t i ~ n . " ~ ~  Surely the United States would not accede to Beijing's 
forced occupation of Taiwan. But the question is just how far 
38. Id. at 21 (quoting Daily Report: China, 'FBIS-CHI-88-107 (June 2, 1988) at 
52). Beijing claims that it cannot commit itself to give up the use of force because 
First, matters that concern national dignity must not be handled at the 
beck and call of a foreign country and any promise that would harm 
national dignity must not be made. For matters relating to China's inter- 
nal &airs, we will not tolerate any foreign country's indiscreet remarks. 
Since some foreign countries have always cast greedy eyes on Taiwan, we 
must not bind ourselves hand and foot and thus be at a loss what to do 
if foreign involvement should occur. Second, the statement is also directed 
against the plot for the "independence of Taiwan." The "movement for 
independence of Taiwan" is making increasing noise and so we must be 
on the alert. Third, the statement is aimed at those Kuomingtang mem- 
bers opposed to reunification. If we promised to relinquish the use of 
force, these people would wax cocky and never accept peace negotiations. 
Qing, "One Country, Two Systems" The Best Way to Peaceful reunification, 33 
BELTING REV. 18, 25 (Aug. 13, 1990). 
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would the United States be willing to go in protecting Tai- 
wan?39 The answer to this question depends, of course, upon 
who is in the White House and the global situation at the time. 
While forced reunification is possible, ''[tlhe Communist 
Party of China has long indicated that peacefully reunimg 
[China is] an established poli~y.~' Still, Beijing's mixed sig- 
nals concerning the use of force have made Taiwan wary of the 
PRC's peacefid overtures." If Beijing's commitment to a peace- 
ful solution is genuine, then it appears that Taiwan holds the 
upper hand in determining its future. This does not mean, 
however, that Taiwan will persuade the PRC to r e d y  under 
ROC Nationalist rule or that Taiwan even wants rellnification. 
An increasingly vocal number of Taiwanese today have little 
desire to become part of the mainland, especially after the 
events of Tienanrnen.42 
2. Taiwan independence or maintaining the status quo 
Taiwan's territory and the make-up of its population has 
remained unchanged for four decades. It is likely to remain the 
same in the hture. The majority of Taiwan's citizens are satis- 
fied with the status quo. However, some local citizens and 
39. One noted China scholar maintains that 
If an invasion of Taiwan were to become imminent, the United States 
might order the return of US. naval forces to the Taiwan Strait. Such an 
action could be justified by several lines of reasoning: that lives would be 
saved, that it would protect Japan's oil lifeline as well as other interna- 
tional commerce in the area, and that it would prevent the Soviet Union 
from exploiting the situation. 
J. COPPER, supm note 1, at 122. 
40. Qing, supra note 38, at 20. 
41. While Beijing's ultimate goal of unification has been consistent, how it will 
reach this goal has alternated between "armed liberation" and "peaceful unifica- 
tion." This phenomenon, as described by one commentator, gives Taipei little 
assurance of Beijing's intentions: 
The use of militant threats or peace overtures has correlated closely 
with the radical or moderate political moods of the nation. During the 
militant periods of the "Resist America and Aid Korea" Campaigns (1950- 
1053), the Great Leap Forward Movement (1958-1961), and the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1971), the policy of armed liberation 
prevailed. Conversely, in the moderate phases of the Bandung spirit 
(1954-1955), the Hundred Flowers Campaign (1955-1956), and the Four 
Modernization Movement (1978-), Beijing s W d  to an accommodating 
posture of peace overtures. 
Kau, supra note 1, at 182. 
42. See id. at 178. 
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overseas Taiwanese organizations advocate independence be- 
cause, while satisfied with Taiwan's economic and political 
success, they believe that independence would bring official 
recognition to Taiwan and increase its stature in the interna- 
tional community. Taiwan's citizens are gaining a stronger 
political voice as Taiwan becomes more democratic. This could 
ultimately frustrate reunification. If Taiwan were successful in 
democratically moving toward independence, official recognition 
of Taiwan as a nation-state would take on new meaning for the 
United States. 
Taiwan's path to independence, however, is strewn with 
many obstacles. First, a majority of Taiwan's leaders and popu- 
lation agree that declaring independence at  this time would 
only provoke the PRC and aggravate Taiwan's diplomatic isola- 
t iod3  Second, cultural and historical arguments exist for not 
perpetuating Taiwan's separation from the mainland. Those 
who fled to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-Shek in 1949, as well as 
the native Taiwanese? are culturally and ethnically Chinese. 
In addition, although throughout history China and Taiwan 
have often been separated, they have always re~nified.4~ 
Third, the ROC government is outspoken in its support for 
reunification. As recently as October 1990, ROC President Lee 
Teng-hui declared that Taiwan and China must reunify and 
that all ROC citizens should work together to realize reunifi- 
cation? Taiwan's business community is also pushing for re- 
unification as commercial relations with the mainland improve. 
In short, Taiwan's current economic prosperity coupled with its 
relationship with the PRC and the United States make inde- 
pendence 'm unlikely course for the near f'uture. What then are 
the prospects for peaceful reunification? 
3. Reunifiation under the PRC's "one country, two systems" 
formula 
The ROC and the PRC each have their own plans for 
43. J. COPPER, supra note 1, at 115. ' 
44. This does not include Taiwan's aborigines which make up 1.5% of Taiwan's 
population. See id. at 8. 
45. Id. 
46. Central News Agency, October 24, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt & 
Intl files) ('"All Chinese believe that China should be unified. The question is how.' 
ROC citizens must shoulder their tnshirkable historic responsibility' of reunifying 
China."). 
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peaceful reun3ication. In recent years, the PRC has encouraged 
the opening of dialogue with ROC leaders and has proposed a 
"one country, two systems" formula for reunifkation. The PRC's 
"one country, two systems" formula proposes that the ROC 
concurrently unify with the PRC while retaining its current 
lifestyle and economic system and enjoying a high degree of 
autonomy." 
While the "one country, two systems" formula was Beijing's 
most significant peaceful overture to Taiwan, i t  was not its 
fmt. Beijing began making peaceful overtures as early as 1979 
when it proposed that Taiwan and the mainland exchange 
postal services, trade, and tourism, as well as begin academic, 
cultural, scientific, and sports contacts." In 1981, the PRC 
proposed a nine-point plan for negotiations between the Chi- 
nese Communist Party (CCP) and Taiwan's Nationalist Party. 
The nine-point plan offered Taiwan a high degree of autonomy, 
including the maintenance of its own armed forces, if it surren- 
dered its sovereignty and independen~e.~' Finally, after 
Beijing concluded the Sino-Britain agreement in 1984, it at- 
tempted to entice Taipei into accepting its Hong Kong plan of 
"one country, two systems" by offering even more favorable 
terms. For example, while the Hong Kong plan gives Hong 
Kong only fifty years of autonomy, Beijing offered to give Tai- 
wan an unspecified longer autonomous period.50 
Taiwan's reaction to these proposals has been negative. 
This is so because the proposals would not give Taiwan any- 
thing it does not already have. The proposals would merely 
further isolate Taiwan by taking away its sovereignty. More- 
over, it will be virtually impossible for the PRC to persuade 
Taiwan to accept the "one country, two systems" formula. Even 
if the formula works for Hong Kong, it might not work for Tai- 
wan. One commentator noted that "[ulnlike Taiwan, Hong 
Kong has never been sovereign; is not now self-governing; is 
not economically viable; and, most important, it cannot defend 
itself because it  has no armed forces. Over time the differences 
between Hong Kong and Taiwan are likely to become more 
47. M. LASATER, POLICY IN EVOLUTION: THE U.S. ROLE IN CHINA'S R~TNIPICA- 
TION 106 (1989). 
48. Kau, supra note 1, at 182. 
49. Id. at 182-83. 
50. Id. at 183. 
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widely appreciatedem51 In short, the "one country, two systems" 
formula, as currently proposed by Beijing, is not acceptable to 
Taiwan. 
4. Peacefil reunifiation under democratic rule 
Peaceful reunification under democratic rule is more likely 
to occur than peaceful reunification under communist rule for 
the simple reason that Taiwan would not voluntarily unify with 
the PRC under communist rule. President Chiang Ching-Kuo 
made it clear when the United States normalized relations 
with the PRC that the ROC would never compromise with 
communism," and the people have echoed his sentiment. 
Public opinion polls show that over ninety-nine percent of 
Taiwan's populace is opposed to living under communist 
rule.53 
Unfortunately, peaceful reunification under democratic 
rule also has its problems. For example, the likelihood of peace- 
ful democratic reunification will probably diminish as economic, 
societal, and political gaps between Taiwan and China widen. 
Nevertheless, peaceful reunification under democratic rule is 
still the most talked about relationship and the articulated goal 
of many from the ROC, the United States, and even the PRC. 
Assuming that peaceful reunification under democratic 
rule is the goal, the ROC can facilitate such reunification by 
influencing change on the mainland. Taiwan must become 
China's model for economic and democratic development 
through increased trade, cultural exchanges, and other mean- 
ingful contacts. To this end, Taiwan is in fact increasing its 
contacts with the mainland. In 1989, nearly 10,000 tourists a 
month from Taiwan visited China, and over 3.4 million pieces 
of mail crossed the strait." ROC trade and investments on 
51. J. COPPER, supm note 1, at 124. 
52. See Kau, supra note 1, a t  177-78 (citing an Address by Chiang Ching-Kuo 
on Dec. 16, 1978, News from China, (Chinese Information Service, N.Y.), Dec. 29, 
1978). Taiwan's opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has also 
declared that "[tlhe future of Taiwan should be determined only by the people on 
Taiwan through free, democratic and fair process. No government or combined 
forces of governments have the right to decide the ultimate political status of Tai- 
wan." Id (quoting Plagorm of the DPP adopted Nov. 10, 1986, 66 LIANHE YUEKAN 
[UNITED MONTHLY] 48 (1987)). 
53. Copper, supra note 14, a t  3. 
54. J. COPPER, supm note 1, at 109. 
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the mainland have also flourished. Trade between Taiwan and 
the mainland neared four billion dollars in 1 9 9 0 . ~ ~  Increased 
contacts between Taiwan and China are propelled by the poten- 
tial economic benefits of increased business contacts, the com- 
mon heritage of Taiwan and China's people, incentives from 
Beijing, and the possibility that Taiwan's wealth could help 
change the PRC's socialist system. 
As an increasing number of PRC citizens witness the pros- 
perity of visitors from Taiwan, there is a greater likelihood that 
they will demand change." This could eventually force Beijing 
to make far-reaching, radical reforms, thus helping the move 
toward reunifi~ation.~' On the other hand, increased contacts 
might also have the opposite effect. As an increasing number of 
visitors from Taiwan discover China's backwardness, over- 
crowding, and corruption, there is a greater likelihood that they 
will not support reunifi~ation.~' Nevertheless, if reunification 
under democratic rule is the goal, Taiwan must convince the 
PRC that Taiwan's system is s~perior.~' 
In summary, Taiwan's future status vis-a-vis the PRC is 
uncertain. Absent major policy changes by the PRC and ROC, 
Taiwan will likely remain part of a divided nation. And, while 
this relationship with the PRC persists, the global community 
will likely continue to treat Taiwan as a unique political entity, 
extending it the rights of a nation-state in some instances while 
withholding these rights in others. Although the ROC'S future 
status vis-a-vis the PRC is uncertain, its superior economic and 
democratic development vis-a-vis the PRC is apparent. Taiwan's 
economic clout appears to be forcing the issue of Taiwan's 
recognition by the global community. Taiwan is playing a larger 
role in the international arena, and with additional official 
55. See From Three Noes to Three Guns, Eco~omsr,  Feb. 9, 1991, at 42. See 
also Lo, Strait Tdk ,  January FREE CHINA REV. 6, 9 (1990). 
56. For a detailed description of Taiwan's economic and political miracles and 
their effect on the PRC, see the economic and political appraisals infra notes 65- 
66. 
57. Myers, supm note 7, at 20. 
58. For a comparison of the economic conditions of the PRC and the ROC, see 
the economic appraisal at infh note 64. 
59. Even as early as one year after Chiang Kai-Shek retreated to Taiwan in 
1949, he told his son, Chiang Ching-Kuo, that they would have to reform the 
Nationalist party and "transform Taiwan into a model province to serve as a base 
for the eventual recovery of mainland China from Communist rule." Myers, supra 
note 7, at 1. Most have ruled out any plan of Taiwan taking back China by force. 
Id. 
recognition from nation-states and international organizations, 
Taiwan has the capacity to play a much larger role. 
The remainder of this article analyzes Taiwan's future and 
proposes a model for enhancing its global status in accordance 
with Asia's changing political and economic order. Section B 
discusses Taiwan's future, giving particular attention to its 
relationship with the United States. Section C then proposes a 
model for enhancing Taiwan's status by officially recognizing it, 
while at the same time, providing a framework within which 
goals of reunification or independence could be advanced. 
B. The Future Status of US.-Taiwan Relations 
Because Taiwan's growth and security rely so heavily on its 
relationship with the United States, the United States' Taiwan 
policy must be considered in any assessment of Taiwan's fu- 
t ~ r e . ~ '  In the past, U.S.-Taiwan relations have acted as a 
barometer for measuring the United States' perception of con- 
ditions in the region. Since conditions have changed dramatically 
over the past decade, the United States should adjust its 
relations with Taiwan to conform with these developments. 
The impetus for normalization of U.S.-PRC relations that 
existed a t  the height of the Cold War no longer exists. During 
the Eighties, the Soviet threat diminished while the United 
States developed new military and political capabilities for 
dealing with the So~iets.~' The failing Soviet economy coupled 
with glasnost have led to agreements to cut back the Soviet 
Union's military arsenal and have reduced US.-Soviet tensions. 
The Soviet Union is also attempting to implement elements of 
market economics and to increase cooperation with the West. 
The PRC is also experiencing severe domestic problems, both 
economically and politically. Its economy is floundering, inflation 
is escalating, and Beding is losing touch with its people. After 
normalization, Americans befriended China in anticipation of 
China's democratization. The prospect of a democratic China has 
now, however, been virtually crushed by the tanks a t  
Tienanmen. As a result of the economic, strategic, and political 
changes in the Pacifk region in the Eighties, the PRC's political 
leverage over the United States has declined, while Japan, 
60. See J. COPPER, supra note 1, at 120. 
61. Myers, supra note 7, at 16. 
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Taiwan, and other Pacific Rim countries are becoming more 
important to the United States.62 
While the economic, strategic and political landscape of Asia 
is changing, U.S. interests in a peaceful and prosperous Pacific 
Rim remain the same. The United States carries on a prosperous 
and significant trade with Taiwan, and U.S. businesses have 
invested billions of dollars in Taiwan's flourishing economy.63 
Taiwan is also strategically located and has offered to give the 
United States military basing rights should the Philippines 
revoke those rights.B4 Finally, the ROC'S successful economic 
modernizationB5 and rapid democratizatione6 offer a powerful 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 20. 
64. Id. 
65. The following is a brief appraisal of Taiwan's economic success: 
Taiwan's rapid economic growth is the envy of Asia. Like Japan, Taiwan took an 
underdeveloped island with few natural resources and, with the efforts of its 
industrious people, performed an economic miracle. Shortly &r their arrival in 
1949, ROC authorities implemented a series of economic and social policy reforms, 
including land reform, which are credited with laying the foundation of Taiwan's 
future economic growth and stability. Taiwan also benefitted from U.S. aid programs 
and from substantial foreign (US., Japanese, and overseas Chinese) investment in 
Labor-intensive, export-oriented industries. Droker & Sander, supra, note 4, at 2. 
Taiwan's economy grew at an average annual rate of 9.2% between 1963 and 
1985. Real GNP growth, which was more than 11% in 1986 and 1987, slowed to 
7.1% in 1988 and 6.5% in the Grst quarter of 1989. INTSL RtADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T 
COM., FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.: TAIWAN 
3 (May 1990) [hereinafter ECONOMIC TRENDS]. Per capita GNP exceeded $6,000 in 
1988--up 20% from 1987, the fourth highest in Asia and twenty times higher than 
the $300 per capita income of the PRC. J. COPPER, supra note 1, at 92. Unemploy- 
ment is about two percent. Labor shortages are appearing in some sectors, such as 
construction. Investment is moving out of Taiwan to lower Laborcost areas such as 
Southeast Asia, Latin America, and even mainland China. 
Frugality, a traditional Chinese virtue, coupled with past government incentives 
to save has given Taiwan one of the highest private savings ratios in the world. 
More than 30% of the GNP for almost every year since 1972 was saved. This 
statistic is changing, however, with increased pressure from US. to buy American 
and encouragement from Taiwan authorities to spend more. Foreign exchange 
reserves stood at $71 billion at the end of 1988, the second highest in the world 
after Japan. Inflation was less than 1.5% in 1987 but was heading for a 3-4% rate 
in 1989. ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra, at 3. 
Historically, Taiwan's economic growth has relied on exports. Between 1952 and 
1988, its exports increased from $120 million to $61 billion, or 19% annually. Droker 
& Sander, supra note 4, at 2. Because of exchange rate appreciation, growing 
domestic demand, and trade liberalization measures, import growth is now 
outstripping the increase in exports. Imports, at $47 billion in 1988, were up 34% 
from 1987, compared to a 13% growth rate for exports. Id. Taiwan is attempting to 
sustain economic growth primarily by upgrading and diversifying its economy. 
Taiwan's attempts to  change have already begun to affect the U.S. Taiwan is opening 
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challenge to mainland China to fundamentally reform its com- 
munist system. Because the ROC is increasingly becoming 
economically, strategically, and politically vital to the United 
its customs doors to U.S. products and its banking doors for US-bound investment. 
Consequently, internal domestic demand rose nearly 18% in 1988, while external 
demand, as measured by the trade surplus, shrank twenty-six percent. The share of 
the services sector for the first time exceeded the share of industry in the economy. 
ECONOMIC TRENDS, supm note 4, at 3. Within the industrial seator itself, the share 
of heavy and high-technology industry in total industrial production rose from 
approximately 57% to 60% last year--at the expense of light industry's share, which 
declined from 43 to 40 percent. Id. 
66. The following is a brief appraisal of Taiwan's democratization: 
Momentous political changes have occurred in Taiwan in the last three years. 
These changes are milestones in the development of democracy in Taiwan. Arguably, 
the most significant change was the late Chiang Ching-kuo's order that lifted the 38- 
year-old martial law on July 14, 1987. The purpose of this move, as reported by 
government spokesman Yu-ming Shaw, was "to accelerate the promotion of 
constitutional democracy, to fully realize the spirit of the constitution, to make 
government and society more open, and to improve the people's well-being." Shaw, 
Emergency Decree Lifted, 38 FREE CHINA REVIEW 6 (October 1987). Taiwan abrogated 
martial law in order to "(1) reduce military control and expand the power of civil 
administration and judicial authority." Id. at 7. For example, civilians will no longer 
be tried in military courts. In addition they sought to  "(2) increase civil rights." Id. 
For example, the rights of the people to form political parties and to demonstrate 
is now protected by law. Id. Taiwan also hoped to "(3) insure that administrative 
authorities adhere to the law. Prior to the lifting of martial law, the administrative 
scope of some government authorities were vague and open to interpretation." Id. 
Taiwan's increasingly healthy political atmosphere, despite recent instability 
across the Strait, is reflected in its people's confidence in Taiwan's future. Taiwan 
authorities realize that domestic confidence and stability is crucial to future growth. 
Even before the late President Chiang lifted martial law, opposition parties had 
been organized. The most popular opposition party, the "Democratic Progressive 
Party" (DPP) was established on September 28, 1986. Jiang, Celebrations and 
Challenges, 38 FREE CHINA REVIEW 5 (October 1987). Even before the DPP was 
officially recognized by law, DPP candidates were allowed to compete with the 
Nationalists for seats in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly in the 
December elections of that same year. Tsai, lYansformations in the Body Politic, 38 
FREE CHJNA REVIE\N, 14 (October 1987). The DPP was successful in obtaiding almost 
one-third of the popular vote. The success of a second party shocked many China 
watchers. One commentator noted that this was "the i h t  time in Chinese history 
that a truly functional opposition party, even though still technically illegal, was able 
to challenge the existing authority in an election on an equal footing." Id. at 15. 
The DPP today is a viable party capable of challenging the Nationalists on every 
front. Taiwan citizens hope that the recent radical political democratization will 
continue and that "future generations will view these times as the beginning of a 
new chapter in Chinese political history." Id. 
In addition to the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, the new chapter in Chinese 
political history will invariably include the lifting of restrictions on visits to the 
mainland, the lifting of restrictions on newspaper size and competition, and some 
hundreds of demonstrations that, unlike Korea's experience, have been mostly ignored 
by the police force. See Andrews, Bansition on Trial, ECONOMIST, March 5, 1988, at 
16. 
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States, the United States should work to improve the current 
international political status of the ROC. 
Under Asia's current economic and political order, it is 
unlikely that the United States would have derecognized the 
ROC, since relations with the PRC would not have been so 
crucial. Taiwan will likely continue to prosper economically 
under its current close, but unofficial, relationship with the 
United States. Taiwan's own prosperity, however, will not 
necessarily foster prosperity throughout the region unless it is 
permitted to actively participate in the international arena. In 
light of the increasingly irrelevant political considerations which 
led to its derecognition, the ROC should no longer be denied 
membership in important international organizations-especially 
financial organizations such as GATT, the International Mone- 
tary Fund, and the World Bank-nor should it be hindered fkom 
conducting normal foreign relations with other nation-states. 
C. A Model for Recognizing the ROC 
One method for recognizing the ROC, without derecognizing 
the PRC, is a modified version of Beijing's "one country, two sys- 
tems" formula discussed above?' Under this model, not only 
would there be one country and two systems, there would also be 
two legitimate governments. Both the PRC and the ROC would 
be officially recognized as governments of China and would be af- 
forded all the rights of recognition. The ROC would continue to 
govern Taiwan, and the PRC would continue to govern the main- 
land. The proposed model is notably different from the PRC's 
"one country, two systems" formula because in addition to 
permitting the ROC to continue governing Taiwan after re- 
unification, it would permit the ROC to share claim to the 
government of China. 
1. International legal precedent for the modified "one country, 
two systems" model 
Although international law has not yet developed sufficient 
rules for dealing with the recognition of two legitimate govern- 
ments of one country, there is some precedent for doing so. The 
most recent and conspicuous examples of the recognition of two 
legitimate governments of one country are Korea and, until 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51. 
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recently, Germany. One scholar identifies countries with more 
than one recognized government as "multi-system nations."' 
They might be better characterized, however, as "dual-system na- 
tions" since, while having more than two systems operating in 
one country is conceivable, our examples involve only two 
systems. Dual-system nations appear to share at  least three 
unique characteristics: (1) both systems once belonged t o  a 
unified country and, while divided now, both expressly maintain 
the goal of reunification; (2) both systems claim to be the 
legitimate government of their country; and (3) both systems 
meet all of the legal qualifications for recognition as an indepen- 
dent state, but do not openly advocate independen~e.~' The 
PRC-ROC relationship also possesses these characteristics. 
Recognition of both governments of a dual-system nation 
would avoid the difficulty that many countries have when faced 
with the choice of recognizing one nation-state at  the expense of 
another. Recognizing each system would not affect any genuine 
goals of reunification, nor would it affect the ROC or PRC's 
domestic policies. The ROC and the PRC could both claim to  be 
the legitimate government of China, and domestically act as 
though they were, while other nation-states would be free to 
enter into diplomatic relations with both. 
The Germany experience suggests that such a system might 
be conducive to reunification. Under Germany's former dual- 
system government, the Federal Republic of Germany (F'DR) and 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) were able to develop closer 
ties and work out their differences. Both the GDR and the FDR 
have been members of the United Nations since 1973. The day 
after both were admitted to the United Nations, the foreign 
ministers of each side, speaking before the General Assembly, re- 
nounced, on behalf of their countries, the use of force in solving 
their differen~es.~~ In 1973, the two sides also entered into an 
agreement to work toward peaceful reunification. In 1974, the 
two opened formal relations with each other.71 All of these 
exchanges helped lead to the eventual reunification of the two 
Germanies. The Korea situation, while still too early to substan- 
68. Chiu, The International Law ofRecognition and Multi-System Nations, 1 CHI- 
NESE Y.B. INTI L. & AFF. 1, 6 (1981). 
69. See Id. 
70. Id. at 9. 
71. Id. 
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tiate, could very well be following a similar tract toward reunification. 
2. China and the modified "one country, two systems' model 
Unless Beijing becomes convinced that a "one country, two 
systems" model would foster reunification, it is doubtful that 
Beijing would accept it. Beijing could indeed argue .that this 
modified model would not foster reunification because, while i t  
attests to one China, it grants Taiwan more sovereignty, further 
separating Taiwan from the mainland. However, the dual-system 
nation or modified "one China, two systems" model could stabi- 
lize the Taiwan situation within the context of the goal of 
reunification. By tolerating an internationally recognized 
Taiwan, the PRC could foster increased communication and 
closer ties with the ROC. This balanced relationship is crucial to 
China's re-cation. If reunification is to be realized, the rela- 
tionship between the ROC and PRC must be one of equality, not 
subordination. 
Findy,  as the popular movement for Taiwan's independence 
intensifies, the model would likely become more favorable to 
Beijing because, under the model, Taiwan would not be allowed 
to  claim independence. In other words, giving Taiwan limited 
sovereignty would probably be preferable to the PRC to giving 
Taiwan absolute sovereignty. 
3. Taiwan and the modifed "one country, two systems' model 
The modified "one country, two systems" model is most 
attractive to Taiwan because it would give Taiwan more than it 
currently has. The model would allow Taiwan to be officially 
recognized by other nation-states, enhancing Taiwan's global 
status and making it  a more active participant in global affairs. 
In spite of enhancing Taiwan's status, the model would perpetu- 
ate the claim that Taiwan is inextricably part of China-a claim 
that independence advocates oppose. Nevertheless, while perpet- 
uating this claim, the model does not force reunification. Taiwan 
would still control its own hture. One might even argue that 
Taiwan would gain even more control over its hture under the 
model because, as Taiwan's international status increases, 
Beijing's threat of forced. reunification would weaken. Thus, the 
proposed model could create a framework in which Taiwan might 
foster either reunification or independence, depending on the will 
of the people. 
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Taiwan's economic and political progress, coupled with the 
changing order of the Pacific region, necessitates a more active 
role for it in  world affairs. Granting Taiwan increased interna- 
tional rights and allowing it to participate in world organizations 
would improve the peace and prosperity of the region. It would 
also foster change in the PRC and affirm Washington's support 
for democracy, a free market economy, human rights, and loyalty 
to its allies. 
The ROC'S global status could be enhanced by official recog- 
nition under a modified version of Beijing's "one country, two 
systems" formula. This model could increase the ROCs global 
stature while providing a framework within which popular goals 
of reunification or independence could be advanced. 
Michael E. Mangelson 
